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Privatization in One Country: Foreign
Investment and the Russian Privatization
Dynamic
By RicHARD C. SCHNEMIER, JR.*
I. Introduction
The following remarks seek to place in context aspects of the
Russian economic reforms, privatization in particular, that may seem
incomprehensible to many non-Russians. I argue that, in Russia, the
privatization program has survived politically because foreign invest-
ment has not played a large role in the process. Russians, notwith-
standing opportunistic political gesturing and rhetoric to the contrary,
have not allowed it to play a larger role.
Two factual anomalies help frame the argument. First, since the
parliamentary elections of December 1993, only one true reformer has
remained in the Yeltsin government: Anatoly Chubais, the Deputy
Prime Minister in charge of privatization and the Chairman of the
State Property Committee. In fact, as this article goes to print, Presi-
dent Yeltsin has elevated Chubais to the post of First Deputy Prime
Minister, where he will have the responsibilities of overseeing the
economy and finance.1 Chubais and the privatization program have
managed to survive the political upheaval that has resulted in the de-
parture of other well-known market reformers such as Yegor Gaidar
and Boris Fedorov.2 Second, while reports vary, foreign investment in
Russia in 1993 amounted to just over $400 million. Poland, a much
smaller country with many of the same systemic problems as Russia,
attracted about the same amount of foreign investment.3
* Assistant Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law.
1. John Lloyd, Twisting and Turning: The Fitful Progress of Russian Economic Re-
form, FiN. Tmms, November 8, 1994, at 16.
2. Some of the most important reformers who have resigned or were asked to tender
their resignations include Boris Fedorov, former Minister of Finance, Yegor Gaidar, for-
mer Economics Minister, Ella Pamfilova, former Social Minister, and Andrei Illarionov,
former economics adviser to Prime Minister Chernomyrdin.
3. Now that Poland has successfully reached a debt restructuring agreement, foreign
investment is likely to increase dramatically.
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These anomalies raise a variety of questions. For example, how
have Chubais and the privatization program survived this long despite
Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's disfavor of the "market romanticism"
espoused by the reformers4 and Boris Fedorov's claim that an "eco-
nomic coup" had occurred?5 Why has so little foreign capital been
invested in Russia, even though Russians have been engaged in an
effort to attract foreign investment since early 1987? Why has priva-
tization not stimulated capital infusions from the West where other
programs have failed? This essay contends that the survival of Rus-
sian privatization and the low level of foreign investment are directly
related.6
Privatization may be viewed from several analytical perspectives.
One perspective, the economic, imposes itself rather forcefully at the
outset. Governments turn to privatization to achieve specific eco-
nomic results. The success or failure of privatization can then be eval-
uated on the basis of a relatively established set of economic and
market indicators. What revenues has the state treasury gained?
How does the privatized company perform? Viewing the Russian ex-
perience from an economic perspective at this time would not be par-
ticularly instructive. First, the entire economy is in crisis. Second,
reliable statistics are difficult to obtain and, once obtained, difficult to
compare to privatizations in radically different economic environ-
ments. Finally, the goals of the Russian privatization program tran-
scend economics alone.
A comparativist perspective of privatization is fruitful for many
reasons. First, governments learn from the achievements of other
privatization programs. Mistakes need not be repeated. Second, a
comparison of different countries' experiences enables certain struc-
4. Jonas Bernstein, Reforms in Russia Hold Firm; Some 'Red' Critics Are Closet Con-
verts, WASH. TIMEs, Aug. 15, 1994, at Al. Chernomyrdin has moderated his position
somewhat since his early statements. While he has not come out as a champion of priva-
tization, he has not tried to roll back the program. The goals of controlling inflation and
limiting the money supply to satisfy the International Monetary Fund have preoccupied
Chernomyrdin during his term as Prime Minister. See also Richard Gwyn, Leaner Russian
Bear Starting to Look Quite Healthy, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 30, 1994, at A17.
5. Barnaby J. Feder, A Russian Reformer is Down but Not Out, N.Y. TIMES, April 26,
1994, at D7.
6. Another argument explaining the survival of privatization has correctly pointed
out that "fu]nlike price liberalization, monetary tightening, and reduction of government
spending, all of which impose painful costs on some people, privatization allocates shares
to the people for free or at low prices - typically a popular measure." Maxim Boycko et
al., Privatizing Russia, in BROOKTNGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC Acrivrry, pt. 2, 139, 147
(William C. Brainard & George L. Perry eds., 1993). Note, however, that the Russian
people would not get the shares if they had been sold to foreigners.
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tural analyses to be performed so that lessons can be generalized.
Certain approaches to privatization may function in developed coun-
tries, but not in developing countries. Comparisons made on an in-
dustry-wide basis may also generate valuable structural or framework
insights. All of these insights assume, however, that the lessons
learned are applicable to a different economic and political
environment.
While such viewpoints may be useful, this essay will adopt a
largely historical-cultural perspective in it's inquiry regarding the link
between foreign investment and privatization in Russia. Paraphrasing
Stalin's remark about socialism in Russia, this essay will look at
"privatization in one country."'7 Russia requires such focus because of
the depth and continuity of its historical and cultural heritage and be-
cause of the uniquely disastrous legacy left by socialism." Culture and
history drive politics in Russia, and privatization is essentially a polit-
ical phenomenon that redistributes control over economic activity.
While the term "privatization" denotes a neutral economic con-
cept meaning to "change [for example, an industry or a business] from
governmental or public ownership or control to private enterprise,"' it
also carries ideological and political connotations because it suggests
something fundamental about an economy or the direction of an
economy. In Russia, the ideological overtones assume an additional
nationalistic nuance. For instance, "privatization" is qualified in a lex-
icon of post-Stalin terminology as:
Just recently, we used the word 'privatization' only with respect to
the West. Most often the word was used in negative contexts, and it
7. The doctrine of "socialism in one country" was formally announced by Joseph Sta-
lin in 1924. Stalin built on a theoretical foundation laid by Nikolai Bukharin. The doctrine
essentially argued that Russia could build a socialist economy totally on its own even
though socialism was not advancing in other countries. See ROBERT C. TxcKEP, STALIN
AS REVOLUrIONARY 377-78 (1974); STEPHEN F. COHEN, BUKHARIN AND THE BOLSHEVIk:
REVOLUTION 187 (1973). In many fundamental respects Russia has also decidcd to go it
alone with respect to privatization, that is without substantial foreign investment. As ;ill
be suggested below, the timing of Stalin's remark, coming as it did at the end of the market
period known as the New Economic Policy (NEP), parallels in significant wa~s rcent de-
velopments in Russia, as the country once again seems attracted by the siren song of cen-
tral planning after a period of market reform. See Yuri N. Afanasyev, Russian Reform Is
Dead Back to Central Planning, FOREIGN AFF., MariApr. 1994, at 21 (Antonina W. Bouis
trans.).
8. This article argues that other states in Eastern Europe, while sharing some charac-
teristics with Russia, are arguably not as enslaved to their pasts. Poland may be a case in
point.
9. AMEmICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGUSH L."%NGUAGE 1442 (3d ed.
1992).
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meant the onslaught by private capital and its political backers
against 'the gains of the working people.'
10
The Russian privatization program, a pillar of the economic re-
form plans supported by Western governments, has recently been de-
nounced in the spirit of nationalism by Prime Minister Viktor
Chernomyrdin as "the mechanical transfer of Western economic
methods to Russian soil."' 1 Moreover, the reform economists most
closely associated with the radical reforms initially pushed by the Yelt-
sin government have been labelled "Western stooges," a bitter charge
made with the intent of rolling back the "Westernized" reforms. For-
eign investors are watched closely to ensure that they do not benefit
unjustly from the sale of state assets. Such eventualities are perhaps
scrutinized most closely by the state enterprise managers who stand to
gain large sums from such transfers if the transfers are not made di-
rectly to foreigners. 2
In short, the agonizing, centuries-old Russian debate between the
so-called "Westernizers" and the Slavophiles has not left the privatiza-
tion process untouched. First, the new Shatalin/Abalkin plan prof-
fered to the Yeltsin/Chernomyrdin government recommends a
rejection of voucher privatization and more active intervention by the
state in the privatization process.' 3 Both changes would, of course,
negatively affect the ability of foreigners to participate in the priva-
tization program. The recommendations of these perestroika-era
economists are offered in the spirit of preserving economic sover-
eignty against the encroachments of the West.
Secondly, while now-First Deputy Prime Minister Chubais has
managed to survive this long, it is hard to predict how long he will
remain untouched even in his new position. He is closely associated
with the Western-style reforms. Press reports often surface that
Chubais may be close to losing his job.' 4 Chubals insisted that he
10. IRINA H. CORTEN, VOCABULARY OF SOVIET SOCIETY AND CULTURE: A SE-
LECTED GUIDE To RUSSIAN WORDS, IDIOMS, AND ExPREssIONs OF THE POST-STALIN
ERA, 1953-1991 116-17 (1992).
11. Fred Kaplan, Reform's Rise and Fall; Western-Style Capitalism Tripped by Hard
Times in Russia, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 23, 1994, at 1.
12. At times such gains come within the legal limits of the privatization program, and
at times they are gotten illegally. For the latter, see the description below of the recent
controversy over the privatization of the Gorky Automobile Factory, or GAZ.
13. Leyla Boulton, Russian Report Urges Pay and Price Controls, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 31,
1994, at 2.
14. See Janet Guttsman, Yeltsin Gives Reformers Vote of Confidence, RErTrER EUR.
Bus. REP., Jan. 13, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD file.
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would remain as privatization minister until the completion of the
voucher privatization program in June 1994.11 He has managed to
achieve that goal. If he now goes the way of Gaidar and Fedorov, it
will be because of his identification with Western reforms, but his
work on privatization will have been largely accomplished.
Foreigners act as lightning rods of hope and repulsion in Russia.
Consequently, this essay develops its argument by looking at the Rus-
sian privatization program from four perspectives, focusing each on
the impact of foreigners.' 6 The four perspectives are (i) economic, (ii)
legal, (iii) political, and (iv) historical. After commenting on each, this
essay concludes with observations on the actual treatment of foreign-
ers in the legal provisions of the current privatization programs. Com-
partmentalizing an analysis of Russian privatization under four
headings enables a complementary view of foreign participation from
four perspectives. On the other hand, such a division does not facili-
tate a purely chronological approach to the evolution of privatization
in Russia. A chronological approach, while perhaps easier to follow
as a narrative, would make an understanding of the different influ-
ences working on foreign participation more difficult. Accordingly,
the following comments build on each other but do not develop
chronologically.
IL Economic Context of Privatization
As noted above, privatization can be analyzed and judged in a
purely economic context. The purpose of presenting an economic
viewpoint here is not to provide the means of evaluating the Russian
program by economic indicators. Rather, this section will describe
some of the unique character of the Soviet economy as the basis for
privatization, and the reform plans that competed to develop that ba-
sis. Each reform plan, of course, had some vision for the role of for-
eign capital in the development of a market economy.
Privatization is only one element in an overall reform strategy
which has consistently stressed four points since the dissolution of the
Soviet Union in 1991: macroeconomic stabilization (stabilization of
15. Russian Liberal Confident of Defending Refonns, FiN. Tmms, Feb. 1. 1994, at 3.
16. Foreigners, of course, is eminently vague terminology. For purposes of this article,
foreigners and Westerners are used synonymously. The role of foreigners in any of the
economic, legal, political, or historical perspectives ranges from actual investment impact
(or lack thereof) to the mere idea or abstraction of foreigners in the Russian mind or in the
discourses of Russian leaders. Foreigners, of course, also play a direct advisory ro!e at
times.
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the ruble); the freeing of prices and economic activity in general by
ending central planning; comprehensive privatization; and the contin-
ued provision of essentials to the impoverished (a social safety net).17
Except for exceptional circumstances under which foreign aid may be
necessary, ruble stabilization for example, privatization offers the only
real port of entry for foreigners aspiring to contribute to (or profit
from) Russia's reforms.
A. Early Reform Period
In the heady days at the end of 1991, before "shock therapy" be-
gan with price liberalization in January 1992, one might have thought
that the perestroika-era advisers would not again be particularly rele-
vant. However, because of the current resurgence of economists and
"reformers" whose formation stretches well into the Soviet past, the
early battle of the reform plans needs to be briefly reviewed.
When he became General Secretary of the Communist Party on
March 11, 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev inherited a deeply flawed and in-
creasingly weakening economy.18 The economy had, without signifi-
cant foreign involvement, managed to flourish by some measures, but
then crept toward extinction. 19 To address these problems, General
Secretary Gorbachev engaged quickly in a rhetoric of change. He in-
troduced terms such as "perestroika" and "glasnost" to dictionaries all
over the world. Another term, "uskorenie," or "acceleration," while
17. See Russian Government Memorandum on Economic Policy, IZvESTIIA, Feb. 28,
1992. See also Jeffrey Sachs, Betrayal, NEw REPUBLIC, Jan. 31, 1994, at 15, and Jeffrey
Sachs, Home Alone 2, NEw REPUBLIC, Dec. 21, 1992, at 25. As the principal foreign eco-
nomic adviser to the Russian Government prior to his resignation on January 21, 1994, the
statements of Mr. Sachs can be interpreted as generally representative of Russian eco-
nomic policies during the period of his influence, from the end of 1991 through the Parlia-
mentary elections on December 12, 1993.
18. Numerous studies have examined the Soviet economy in the recent period both
historically and theoretically. Among the best are ANDERS ASLUND, GORBACHV'S
STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC REFORM (1989); MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN, VHAT WENT
WRONG WITH PERESTROIKA (1991); and ED A. HEwETr, REFORMING THE SOVIET ECON-
oMY: EQUALITY VERSUS EFFICIENCY (1988) [hereinafter REFORMING THE SOVIET
ECONOMY].
19. As Ed Hewett, an expert on Soviet economics has argued: "When Mikhail
Gorbachev assumed the Soviet leadership in 1985 he found an economy that was big, was
inefficient, and was playing a marginal role in the global economy. Each of these charac-
teristics is striking testimony to how far rich resources and ruthless determination can take
a country committed to minimizing its links with the outside world." ED A. HEWE-T &
CLIFFORD G. GADDY, OPEN FOR BUSINESS: RUSSIA'S RETURN TO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
4 (1992) [hereinafter OPEN FOR BUSINESS].
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not gaining international linguistic currency, described his early eco-
nomic reform plans.20
From 1985 to 1986, the rhetoric of uskorenie had little theoretical
underpinning. Acceleration was to involve an increase in growth
rates, intensive development of technologies, and positive changes in
the attitudes of the people toward their roles as instigators of eco-
nomic development.21 Gorbachev's early reform ideas, however,
while envisioning the decentralization of some decision-making, did
not fundamentally disturb the crucial role of central planning or state
ownership. As economists have also demonstrated, acceleration to re-
covery did not contemplate any significant overtures to the West or to
Western capital or technologies. 2 What Gorbachev wanted most of
all was to catch up economically without creating any risk of foreign
exploitation.
In June 1987, uskorenie received programmatic support when the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU) adopted a blueprint for economic reform called the "Basic
Tenets for the Radical Restructuring of the Management of the Econ-
omy" ("Basic Tenets"). 3 The Basic Tenets relied on four principal
elements: maintenance of central planning; performance incentives;
greater enterprise autonomy; and more worker participation in man-
agement.2 a Not surprisingly, the Basic Tenets did not propose priva-
tization as a component of reform during this early period. Rather,
the whole package focused on the "devolution of decision-making
powers to state-owned enterprises in the context of a vaguely defined
combination of central planning and market. ' By the time the Basic
Tenets were adopted, however, Gorbachev's own thinking about the
20. In an address to the 27th Party Congress in February 1986, the Congress during
which Gorbachev expressed most strongly his early attitudes toward economic reforms,
Gorbachev said "[t]he acceleration of the social-economic development of the country is
the key to all our problems: near-term and long term, economic and social, political and
ideological, internal and foreign." REFr MING ThE Sovmr EcONoMY, supra note 18, at
306. Gorbachev's statement sounds quite ironic today since acceleration occurred, but in a
quite unexpected direction.
21. Id.
22. OPEN FOR BusmNEss, supra note 19, at 26.
23. Osnovnie polozheniya korennoi perestroiki upravleniya ekonomilA,, PrAVDA,
June 27, 1987, at 2.
24. R Fo RWNG -rIm SovIET EcONOMY, supra note 18, at 349-50.
25. Ed A. Hewett, Perestroyka and the Congress of People's Deputies, in Mu.ErTo.NTS
IN GLASNOST AND PEREsTnOYKA: Tim EcoNox " 309 (Ed A. Hewett & V. H. Winston
eds., 1991) [hereinafter MU..nsTONs]. Recall that, notwithstanding the emphasis on main-
taining state ownership, joint ventures with foreign partners had already begun to be estab-
lished in the Soviet Union, as discussed below.
1994]
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need for foreign investment had changed substantially. In fact, his
overtures to the capitalist countries began with a joint venture decree
in early 1987.
Why did Gorbachev's outlook on foreign involvement change so
quickly from outright prohibition to protectionism (implying that
some, but not too much, foreign investment would be sought)? With
the aid of a few reform economists, Gorbachev became largely con-
vinced of the necessity of foreign capital to buttress his reform plans.
In an instance of executive fiat quite familiar to Russians, Gorbachev
invited foreign investment by decree despite the preference of most of
the country's economists and bureaucrats for a slower track.26 When
did economists start to catch up and was there a backlash to the sud-
den inclusion of foreigners in the reform calculus?
B. Abalkin Commission
Classic central planning in the Soviet system did not generally
involve economists. In fact, the influence of economists did not match
that of engineers in the state planning bureaus. Economists and eco-
nomic theories implied scarcity and the Soviet government did not
admit the existence of scarcity in the socialist system. Rather, central
planning involved the mere mobilization of resources.27 Therefore,
the appointment in the summer of 1989 of Academician Leonid I.
Abalkin to the post of Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the
State Commission on Economic Reform ("Abalkin Commission") of
the USSR Council of Ministers departed sharply in spirit from exclu-
sive reliance on central planning. The appointment also implied an
admission that scarcity did have to be reckoned with at the highest
level of govemment.28
In October 1989, the Abalkin Commission proposed a more pro-
gressive approach to economic reform than had been set forth in the
Basic Tenets. The Commission did not support a program of priva-
tization, but rather set forth principles of a program for the "destatiza-
26. Particularly novel and potentially unpopular reforms such as the opening of the
economy to foreign investment are typically initiated in a top-down fashion in Russia, with-
out even the pretext of parliamentary involvement. Thus, Gorbachev's initiative came in
the form of a decree instead of a law. Yeltsin's more radical economic measures have also
come in the form of decrees.
27. PEKKA SUTELA, ECONOMIC THoUOrHT AND ECONOMIC REFORMiu IN THE SOVIET
UNION 29 (1991).
28. OPEN FOR BusIN-ss, supra note 19, at 103.
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tion"2 9 of certain state property in favor of workers who had entered
into leasing arrangements for property with the state. "Privatization"
was still too politically charged at the time. Private property concepts
were only beginning to be envisioned.' Instead, the Commission
took a less drastic step to introduce the concept of non-state owner-
ship in the context of worker control. Despite a desperate need for
investment from abroad, the Commission did not build on the role of
foreign capital which had already begun in the joint venture program.
In December 1989, the USSR Congress of People's Deputies
adopted the proposals of the Abalkin Commission in substance.
Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov, who later would distance himself
from this approach and propose his own less progressive alternative to
the Supreme Soviet, actually presented the proposals to the Congress
for adoption. The Abalkin Commission proposals were, however,
never formally made government or party policy because of the even-
tual adoption by Gorbachev of the vague provisions of the Presiden-
tial Plan.
By 1990, the Soviet economy was in a steep, some thought irrevo-
cable decline. Everyone agreed that perestroika had failed, but there
was much disagreement over how to fix it. The early reforms had
proved ineffective, and the command economy was still firmly in
place. A consensus began to develop around the need for market re-
form accompanied by decentralization, price liberalization, and priva-
tization .3  New questions were posed: How far? How fast? What
29. Destatization (razgosudarstvenkve in Russian) means a process that is best de-
scribed by a more or less literal rendering of the Russian term: disentanglement from
government. As such, destatization is not a synonym for denationalization or for privatiz.-
tion, which mean the actual return of state property to private parties. Rather, destatiza-
tion is a process of enterprise positioning that progressively de-emphasizcs state
involvement. It is the contrary of the French term Jtatisation which means the dormnation
of the economy and of social and political life by the state. Destatization reverse: the
process. See John N. Hazard, Gorbachev's Attack on Stalin's Etatisauton of Ownership, 2.3
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 207, 207 n.1 (1990); EUROPEAN BXg FoR Rcouz.-mu o-.
AND DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, THE ECONOMY CF THE USSR:
A STUDY UNDERTAKEN IN RESPONSE TO A REQLEST By THE HousOato Sir'irr, Svm ..
iARY RECOMMNDATIONS 2, 26-27 (1990) [hereinafter SUMMARv AND
RECONMNDATIONS].
30. New ownership and property laws were adopted in the Soviet Union in March
1990. Zakon SSSR o sobstvennosti [Law on Property], PRAVDA, Mar. 10, 1990; Osnc,v
zakonodatel'stva SSSR i soyuznykh respublik o zemle [Fundamentals of legislation of the
USSR and Soviet republics on land], EKONOMIKA I ZnzN', 11:17-20 (1990).
31. As the Presidential Plan itself noted, "there is no alternative to shifting to a market
economy." Quoted in SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 29, at 12. The au-
thors of SUMMARY AND REcoMMNENDATIONs note this development. Id. at 11.
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state assets should be sold? Should more or different concessions be
made to attract foreign capital?
On March 15, 1990, the Third Congress of People's Deputies of
the Soviet Union elected Mikhail Gorbachev to the newly created
post of President of the USSR. At that time, roughly one year before
a privatization law was adopted by the Russian Parliament, the pro-
ductive sector of the Soviet economy was dominated, as it had been
for decades, by state-owned enterprises. According to the study un-
dertaken by the International Monetary Fund and other multilateral
organizations at the request of the Houston Summit of the G-7, there
were approximately 47,000 state-owned enterprises in the industrial
sector in mid-1990. Those enterprises employed almost 40 million
people and "30-40 percent of total industrial output [was] accounted
for by products for which there [was] but a single manufacturer.
32
According to the Soviet State Statistical Bureau, Goskomstat, approx-
imately ninety-five percent of all productive assets in mid-1990 were
owned by the state or were part of the state-controlled collective farm
system. Private ownership and cooperative ownership accounted for
less than four percent of the ownership of total productive assets.
3 3
State domination of the economy was, therefore, near total. No
other privatization program has faced so many enterprises requiring
privatization. Joint ventures with foreign firms, created pursuant to
Gorbachev's enabling decree, were not fully state-owned, but they ac-
counted for very little productive capacity. Goskomstat reported a
total of 620 such joint ventures registered in 1990 with a total output
of about 3.2 billion rubles (in current prices) compared to a total out-
put in the whole state sector of over 930 billion rubles (in current
prices). Joint ventures also employed about 66,000 individuals.34 The
figures reveal the tiny role played by foreign capital in the initial
stages of the privatization process. Figures for total Soviet contribu-
tions to joint ventures with foreigners, matters which were subject to
intense negotiations in any case, are not reliably available. Within the
joint ventures in the manufacturing sector, most of the Soviet contri-
butions came in the form of employees and raw materials.
Statistics for mid-1990 are especially interesting as background
for a discussion of privatization. First, as discussed below, in mid-1990
32. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 29, at 26.
33. Philip Hanson, Property Rights in the New Phase of Reforms, in MILESTONES,
supra note 25, at 420.
34. See TmE PRIVATIZATION PROCESS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE AND THE BALTIc STATEs
37-38 (A. Rapaczynski et al. eds., 1993).
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the economic reform plans of Gorbachev and Yeltsin began to diverge
in significant ways. Second, the figures are insulated somewhat from
the incredible social and economic dislocations experienced in 1991,
when Russia and the Soviet Union clashed irreconcilably.
C. Shatalin Proposals
Stanislav Shatalin and a group of economists and economic advis-
ers to Yeltsin and to President Gorbachev, including Leonid Abalkin,
Nikolai Petrakov, Grigory Yavlinsky, and Boris Fedorov (the same
one who not too long ago resigned as the Minister of Finance of Rus-
sia), made up the Shatalin working group. The USSR Supreme Soviet
had rejected the Ryzhkov proposals for reform after their submission
in May 1990. Yeltsin and Gorbachev, in an interlude of political coop-
eration, requested Shatalin to provide a common strategy for eco-
nomic reform to be submitted to the Supreme Soviet by September
1990. The result is commonly referred to as the 500-day plan for eco-
nomic reform.
The 500-day plan identified "universal state ownership" ["vse-
obshchnost' gossobstvennosti"] as one of the principal reasons for the
failure of the socialist economy and causes of the attempts to reform
the economy by perestroika, or restructuring.3 5 Consequently, the
critical phase of the reforms would be known as the "destatization"
stage. Completion of that phase would lead directly to a full-scale
privatization program. The emphasis of the 500-day plan on destatiza-
tion and subsequent privatization set it apart from the Abalkin Com-
mission proposals. In this sense, the 500-day plan constituted a
turning point in Soviet economic planning.
Like the Abalkin Commission report, however, the 500-day plan
did not outline a direct role for foreign investment in the privatization
process. Nevertheless, the 500-day plan recognized more directly than
previous plans the need generally for foreign involvement in the revi-
talization of the economy. It specifically provided for the declaration
during the preparatory phase (first 100 days) of equal treatment of
economic activities whether undertaken by foreign or Soviet entities.2 '
35. 0 programme perekhoda k rynochnoi ekonomike: Programma minirnmm -
mandat doveriya na 500 dnei, MANDATE, at 1; also paraphrased in Helen Womack, Rumors
of Coup as Moscow Deputies Dither over Shatalin, INDEPENDENrT, Sept. 23. 199, at 10 ( ne
premise of the 500-day plan was that the "Soviet people have lost all incentive to improv a
their lives because the state has robbed them of their birthright-property.".
36. MANDATE, supra note 35, at 3. See also Wlliam A. Niskanen, Soviet Hopes Rest
on the 500-Da, Plan, JAPAN ECON. J., Nov. 17, 1990, at 9.
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It recommended the removal of barriers to foreign investment,3 7
Moreover, although it provided no details, the plan mentioned foreign
investment in the discussion of the destatization phase (Day 100 to
Day 250). 31 Finally, the Shatalin working group recommended that
the Supreme Soviet adopt a foreign investment law and a law on free
economic zones during the second phase. 39 All in all, the 500-day plan
foresaw a substantial role for foreign investment and the need to facil-
itate that investment by the enactment of special concessions and the
according of equal treatment to foreign investors in all other areas.
The 500-day plan brought Soviet economic thinking to a new
threshold regarding foreign investment. The process that had been
initiated by the promulgation of the Joint Venture Decree had found
full theoretical support in the work of Shatalin and his advisers. While
the link to privatization remained to be forged, the conceptual gap
had been closed. Eventually, the 500-day plan itself got caught up in
the reality of Soviet politics. Yeltsin and his "Westernizers" supported
and adopted it, whereas Gorbachev and his recidivist colleagues were
entirely reluctant to follow its prescriptions. Certainly, one of the
flashpoints of the 500-day plan was its reliance on the attraction of
foreign capital.
D. Presidential Plan
On September 24, 1990, the USSR Supreme Soviet authorized
President Gorbachev to regulate the economy by decree until March
31, 1992.40 The reform plan ultimately backed by President
Gorbachev and adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet on October 19,
1990, incorporated some of the basic features of the 500-day plan, but
lacked specifics.4' For instance, it did not advocate as thorough a
privatization program, nor did it offer a detailed timetable for the ac-
tual conversion of state properties. Gorbachev had acted more boldly
when he signed the Joint Venture Decree three years earlier. But in
1990, Gorbachev appeared to be unwilling to seize the initiative with
37. MANDATE, supra note 35, at 6; See also Philip Hanson, Yeltsin in the Fast Lane,
LONDON TiMms, Sept. 10, 1990.
38. MANDATE, supra note 35, at 10. See also Womack, supra note 35.
39. MANDATE, supra note 35, at 14.
40. See Law on Emergency Presidential Powers, BBC SUrMMARY OF WORLD BROAD-
CASTS., Sept. 26, 1990, available in LEXIS, World Library, ARCNWS File. Gorbachev lost
power well before his economic mandate from the Supreme Soviet came to term.
41. The basic guidelines for stabilization of the national economy and transition to a
market economy, the Presidential Plan, was published in USSR: The Basic Positions of the
Soviet Economy, Izvs'rIA, Oct. 27, 1990.
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respect to foreign investment. He did not challenge extremists who
viewed the West with profound suspicion and hostility.42 Nonetheless,
as one economist has suggested, the Presidential Plan "along with a
spate of new laws already on the books, would ultimately destroy the
venerable institutions of Stalinist central planning and create new
ones suited to a market economy with a substantial state sector."'
43
It is interesting to note that the architects of the Presidential Plan,
including Leonid Abalkin and, to a certain extent, Shatalin himself,
are the very economists who now seem to have surpassed in stature
many of their younger, reform-minded colleagues. They recently pro-
posed economic reforms that would include wage and price freezes
and a return to certain aspects of central-planning. 44 Their proposals
made to Gorbachev, which were not culminated, seem to have ac-
quired a new life.
E. Western Plans
The Presidential Plan provided the historical jumping off place
for the report cited above by several multilateral finance institutions
at the request of the G-7 countries. The Summary and Recommenda-
tions was submitted on December 19, 1990. It purported to be the
official prescription by Western doctors for the critically ailing Soviet
economy. Of course, only "Westernized" Soviet reformers were open
at that time to prescriptions coming from the West. The more inter-
esting questions concerned the motives, spoken or unspoken, behind
the G-7's nostrums. How much sensitivity was there to biases within
Russia against foreign strategies for Russia's own recovery?
The Summary and Recommendations rendered generally indirect
criticism of the Presidential Plan. While calling for rapid movement
toward a market economy, the outlines of the Presidential Plan were
described as "gradualist," "vague as to methods," and without "spe-
cific time horizon."' 5 Nevertheless, the report accurately recognized
disadvantages to across-the-board rapid privatization:
[W]hen relative prices are still unsettled, the value of enterprises is
difficult to assess. Firms might be acquired at far below (or even far
42. See DAVID REMNICK, LENIn's To.sm 359-60, 371 (1994).
43. Gertrude E. Schroeder, Perestroyka in the Aftermath of 1990, in MILESTONES,
supra note 25, at 459, 462.
44. See Russia: Economics Minister on "Rational" Policy of State Regulation of Econ-
omy, BBC MONITORING SERVICE - U.S.S.R., Feb. 15, 1994, available in WL, INT-NEWS
File.
45. SuNs.AY AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 29, at 12.
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above) their actual values, and ownership might become concen-
trated in the hands of a relatively few individuals with money or
connections.
4 6
The authors also raised the possibility of a tradeoff between revenues
to the state budget from asset sales and the advantages of getting
property into the hands of a large proportion of the population
through voucher distributions.47
The implication behind much of the discussion in the Summary
and Recommendations is that foreign investment will not play a major
role because of the just-mentioned shortcomings and considerations in
the privatization process itself. The report described the meager com-
mitment of foreign capital to the Soviet economy by the end of 1990.
It mentioned that joint ventures had achieved very little of the capital
inflow hoped for in Soviet planning.48 The report envisaged a signifi-
cant role for foreign investment, but largely outside of the privatiza-
tion framework. To that extent, the report demonstrated a sensitivity
to Soviet realities, but its very existence may have produced exactly
the opposite of the desired effect in view of the paranoia about West-
ern ideas in Moscow.
After the Summary and Recommendations was introduced and
near the same time a coup attempt was launched against President
Gorbachev in August 1991, a joint working group of scholars from the
United States and the Soviet Union finished a description of what
they called the "grand bargain."4 9 The underlying assumption of the
grand bargain was that the destinies of the United States and the So-
viet Union were so intertwined that neither would succeed in the tran-
sition to a new world order without the other. The study claimed that
"the clear lesson of recent history is that without deep Western coop-
eration and assistance, the Soviet Union's chances of reaching its des-
tination successfully in the foreseeable future will be few."
50
The destination of the Soviet Union foreseen in the grand bargain
meant democracy and a market economy. The underlying premise of
the grand bargain would be entirely antithetical to Russians convinced
46. Id. at 26. These remarks have been borne out by actual experience.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 30.
49. GRAHAM ALLISON AND GRIGORY YAVLINSKY, WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY: TE
GRAND BARGAIN FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE SOVIET UNION (1991) [hereinafter GRAND
BARGAIN]. The John F. Kennedy School of Government of Harvard University and the
Center for Economic and Political Research (Epcenter) of Moscow collaborated in the
elaboration of the GRAND BARGAIN.
50. Id. at 8.
[Vol. 17:697
Foreign Investment and the Russian Privatization Dynamic
that their destiny was to make it on their own. The grand bargain
certainly violated the principle of "socialism in one country," which
ran throughout the economic planning agenda as the need to establish
the independence of Russia from the (pernicious) influence of foreign
plans. In fact, it is difficult to imagine a statement more at variance
than the one quoted above with even the very mildest forms of Rus-
sian nationalism, not to mention the more radical versions.
Nevertheless, the grand bargain comes closest, relative to other
major reform plans, to the privatization program eventually elabo-
rated by Yeltsin's reformers. It was co-authored by Grigory Yavlin-
sky, who served as Deputy Prime Minister of the new Russian
Government and Chairman of the Russian Commission on Economic
Reform in the early phase of President Yeltsin's reforms. As men-
tioned above, Yavlinsky also worked on the 500-day plan. The study
breaks economic recovery into two phases: phase one involved the
creation of the necessary legal and economic frameworks and was to
last from 1991 to 1993,51 and phase two focused on the so-called "in-
tensification of structural reforms" from 1994 through 1997.52
Small-scale privatization (small retail stores, trucks, cars, and
some agricultural land) was to take place in the short term (mid-1991
through early 1992), followed by the adoption of necessary legislation
and the positioning (destatization) of large-scale enterprises for priva-
tization (throughout 1992). The last stage of phase one (1993) con-
templated the realization and intensification of large-scale
privatization.
Recommendations in the grand bargain regarding foreign invest-
ment in Russia paralleled, but did not intersect, their proposals for
privatization reforms. Early actions were to include the conclusion of
bilateral investment treaties, the adoption of new, progressive foreign
investment laws, and the encouragement of foreign investment
through monetary stability and the removal of trade barriers. In 1993,
as the proposal foresaw the intensification of large-scale privatization,
it also recommended that "[p]articipation rules for foreign investors in
the privatization of large-scale and medium-scale enterprises ... be
liberalized."5 3 The gradual, as opposed to sudden, elimination of re-
strictions on foreigners indicated, perhaps, an understanding of the
51. Id at 39.
52. Id at 63.
53. Id. at 59.
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relationship between the durability of privatization and the temporary
need to keep foreigners at a distance.
By August 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev had seen thirteen reform
programs and rejected them all.54 Then came the coup attempt of Au-
gust 1991, which precipitated the total dissolution of the Soviet Union
in December 1991. Reform plans came to a temporary halt. Presi-
dent Yeltsin seized the opportunity presented by his overwhelming
popularity immediately after the failed coup to affect his own radical
reforms. For a few months, no specific "plans" competed with Yelt-
sin's, although, as discussed below, ideological differences inflamed
immediately. Yeltsin's powers were confirmed in early November
1991 when the Russian Parliament conferred on him the authority to
legislate economic matters by decree, thereby permitting Yeltsin to
inherit the authority Gorbachev was in the process of losing.
The foregoing discussion of economists and competing economic
plans must be completed by descriptions of legal and political events.
With respect to legal developments, this requires a return to 1987,
when Gorbachev signed the Joint Venture Decree.
M. Legal Context of Privatization
While economists and bureaucrats debated critical aspects of cen-
tral planning and the bureaucratic state, strong executives, Gorbachev
and then Yeltsin, took concrete steps to open the economy to foreign
capital. The legal measures were at first tentative and characterized
by a deep ambivalence about foreign investment. In less than five
years, however, the Soviet Union evolved from an economy without
foreign investment to one which permitted the penetration of foreign
capital at all levels, except for certain defense-related industries. In
the early stages of this development, the Soviet Union and Russia
were indistinguishable. At the end of the process, the two openly
competed with each other for purely political reasons to present at-
tractive investment environments. Before the competition could
reach a conclusion, however, Soviet actions no longer seemed to mat-
ter to anyone except historians.
Alongside the initiatives relating to foreign investment, the Soviet
Union and Russia began to lay the legal groundwork for privatization
within their separate spheres. The processes were theoretically
viewed as complementary. Privatization of large-scale industries
would especially require substantial foreign investment. The reasons
54. The Road to Ruin, EcoNoMisT, Jan. 29, 1994, at 23.
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were several: first, large-scale industries needed a massive technologi-
cal boost. Second, large-scale industries accounted for a large propor-
tion of the "value" of the Soviet economy, and it was acknowledged
that only foreigners would have the necessary funds to purchase such
"value." Finally, privatization was to provide revenues for the state
treasury and, again, only foreigners had such funds. Such reasoning
paralleled the Western view of the justification for privatization.
A. The Joint Venture Decree
Decades of isolation by the Soviet Union from foreign capital
ended on January 13, 1987, when the USSR Council of Ministers is-
sued a decree on joint ventures.-5 Why did Gorbachev choose to end
the isolation? While the Joint Venture Decree was calculated purely
as a means to attract foreign capital, did it in fact produce other, unex-
pected counter-results? What were Gorbachev's expectations?
An explanation offered by an economist closely associated ith
the early perestroika reforms suffices to give the official view of the
policies motivating the Joint Venture Decree. Abel Aganbegyan
wrote:
Through the joint enterprises [with foreign firms] we want to attract
advanced technology and managerial experience. Furthermore,
joint enterprises should eliminate the need for a number of imports
and develop our export base, since part of the output of the joint
enterprises will have to be sold abroad to cover their foreign cur-
rency expenses.5 6
Academician Aganbegyan hoped for a substantial infusion of for-
eign capital as a result of the decree. Another, more cynical, but
equally realistic, explanation of the early reforms, including the Joint
Venture Decree, described the Communist Party as "making an open
confession of ideological, economic and financial bankruptcy, while
carrying through an extremely complex revolution from above."' 7 In
either case, the effect of the Joint Venture Decree was to import some
55. 0 poriadke sozdaniia na territorii SSSR i deiatel'nosti sovmestnkh predpriiatii,
mezhdunarodnykh ob"edinenii i firm kapitalisticheskikh i razvivaiushchikhsia stran [On
the procedure to create on Soviet territory, and regulating the activities of, joint ventures,
international organizations, and firms of capitalist and developed countries][hereinafter
"Joint Venture Decree"], a thorough summary of which appeared in PRAvmt, January 27,
1987, at 1.
56. Abel Aganbegyan, INSmE PERESTROnmA 198 (199).
57. The Perils of Perestroika, FiN. Tamms, Feb. 28, 1989, at 16, quoted in Osakwe, The
Death of Ideology in Soviet Foreign Investment Policy: A Clinical Examination of the Soviet
Joint Venture Law of 1987,22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L 2, 17 n2.8 (1989).
1994]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
small measure of flexibility and initiative into the central-planning re-
gime. While the joint ventures formed under the decree operated
outside of the plan, they depended on the plan for certain inputs, as
legally required, making the Soviet partner indispensable to the well-
being of the joint venture.
The very existence of the Joint Venture Decree demonstrated
that years of total avoidance of foreign capital had ended. The evolu-
tion of the Joint Venture Decree, however, provided an example of
the continuing Soviet ambivalence towards foreign capital. The de-
cree initially permitted foreign investment up to a level corresponding
to no more than 49 percent of the ownership in the joint venture. The
Soviet party had to maintain the majority of shares, and the chairman
and general director of the joint enterprise had to be Soviet nationals.
Moreover, the foreign partner faced a complicated approval process
and could repatriate profit in hard currency only to the extent that the
joint venture generated hard currency revenues. Such restrictions
prompted many interested foreign companies to invest their capital
elsewhere.
The low level of foreign investment and the continuing poor per-
formance of the economy created the need to improve the environ-
ment for foreigners notwithstanding Soviet ambivalence about them.
58
The Soviet government tinkered with the Joint Venture Decree for
several years after its original adoption.59 Amendments eventually
eliminated the discriminatory restrictions on share ownership and ex-
ecutive nationality, and also streamlined the approval process. The
restriction on capital repatriation, however, was never removed from
the Joint Venture Decree. The changes showed a new spirit of respon-
siveness to the demands of foreign capital. They also proved that So-
viet expectations had not been met in the original formulation of the
decree.
58. The total number of joint ventures with foreign partners registered in the last three
quarters of 1987 was 23. When the restrictions began to be relaxed, the number of registra-
tions increased regularly to a total of 168 during 1988, 86 during the last quarter. About
550-750 joint.ventures were anticipated for 1989. USSR: East West Joint Ventures on the
Increase, LLOYD'S LIST, Mar. 31, 1989, available in WL, INT-NWS File.
59. The Council of Ministers of the USSR amended and supplemented the Joint Ven-
ture Decree by further decrees of September 17, 1987, March 17, 1988, and May 6, 1989.
Note that the entire joint venture framework was elaborated by decree (postanovlenie) and
not by law (zakon). The legal form chosen for economic relations with foreigners, decrees
often being easier and less political to adopt than laws, points as well at the ambivalence
endured by the Russians in such relations.
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The Joint Venture Decree constituted in substance, if not in in-
tent, the first privatization decree. It was never viewed as such by its
drafters, nor did the economic reformers really consider it to be a
form of privatization. It has, however, been correctly labelled "creep-
ing privatization."60 Under the Joint Venture Decree, Soviet enter-
prises were permitted to contribute productive assets to a new legal
entity, the joint venture, owned in part by a foreign partner. Conse-
quently, the legal regime for privatization began well in advance of
the theoretical norms for privatization that were being developed by
the various Soviet planners.6 1 While the role of foreigners was down-
played in privatization programs, foreign joint ventures broke new
ground in the destatization process.
But what did "ownership" mean in a system that had yet to rec-
ognize the right of individuals or legal entities to full private owner-
ship in all classes of property?62 The loss of total control over the
Soviet state assets amounted to a rudimentary form of privatization,
but without property law reform, true privatization could not occur."s
Gorbachev's failure to legalize private ownership of productive prop-
erty significantly handicapped the injection of foreign capital into the
Soviet economy.' 4 Predictably, foreigners wanted certainty in the
legal treatment of their investments. But defective property laws have
persisted into the most recent period of reform. In many ways, the
existence of defective property laws precipitated the "war of laws"
60. See Osakwe, supra note 57, at 12-26.
61. As noted, the Joint Venture Decree was adopted in January 19S7, six months
before the promulgation of the Basic Tenets, which themselves did not provide for pniva-
tization as a component of reform.
62. The inconsistencies of the joint venture regime with other aspects of Soviet lars,
especially Soviet property laws, have been pointed out on several occasions. See, among
others, Richard C. Schneider, Jr., Developments in Soviet Property Law, 13 FORDHAM
INT'L LJ. 446 (1989).
63. The privatization aspects of joint ventures became evident in two ways %hen true
privatization came into being in Russia. Frst, the drafters of the privatization laws, de-
crees, and programs had to decide how to treat the existing joint ventures under the new
regime. Second, Western companies and potential Russian partners tried unsuccessfully
to avoid the technicalities and procedures of the privatization regime by treating their own
negotiations as leading toward the formation of a joint venture rather than as constituting a
privatization.
64. As Richard Ericson has written in a broader context, "perestroika had blocked the
development of real money, of real property rights, of real markets and their necessary
supporting financial structures, and of a legal environment supportive and protective of
private (nonstate) economic activity and interaction." Richard E. Ericson, Economics, in
AFTER =hE Sovm UNION: FROM Emnmn TO NATIONS 49,52 (Timothy J. Colton & Rob-
ert Levgold eds., 1992).
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that pitted Yeltsin's reforms directly against the flawed reforms of
Gorbachev.
B. Foreign Investment Laws
After adoption of the Joint Venture Decree, Soviet lawmakers
enacted or adopted a series of laws and decrees intended to open the
economy to greater initiative. While these entrepreneurial laws cre-
ated numerous benefits, they did not fundamentally challenge the
dominant role of the state in the economy, namely, its gtatisation.5
By the end of 1990, the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation (still
the RSFSR at that time) had adopted economic reform plans that
were at variance with each other, both as to the nature of reform to be
achieved, as well as the speed at which any reform would be insti-
tuted. Only the Russian plan contemplated a fully developed priva-
tization program.
It is interesting to compare the skirmishes in the "war of laws"
just before the time when the 500-day plan was presented to Yeltsin
and Gorbachev. The Soviets enacted three decrees in August 1990.
One was intended to encourage the development of small business
enterprises. 66 The other two dealt with more structural inheritances
from the Soviet past and were centrally concerned with laying the
groundwork for a privatization regime. A USSR State Property Fund
was created by a decree adopted on August 9, 1990, and another de-
cree on demonopolization became law on August 16, 1990.67
Drafts of privatization laws circulated within the Soviet govern-
ment in mid-1990. 68 Without doubt, the promulgation of the August
9th and August 16th decrees were intended to be legal preliminaries.
Still, it is curious, and a sign of the reigning confusion, that draft priva-
tization laws would be circulating when the Soviet government itself
had rejected the soft approach to privatization set forth in the
65. A representative sampling of the laws and decrees referred to might include the
following: Law on Cooperatives, Law on State Enterprises, Law on Enterprises and En-
trepreneurial Activity, Decree on the Fundamentals of Leasing Legislation, and Law on
Property.
66. 0 merakh po sozdaniju i razvitiju malykh predprijatii [Decree on Measures to En-
courage the Establishment and Development of Small Enterprises], USSR Council of Min-
isters Decree No. 790, Aug. 8, 1990, Sobranie postanovlenii pravitel'stva SSSR, no. 19, at
433-40.
67. Decree on the Formation of the USSR State Property Fund and Decree on Meas-
ures for the Demonopolization of the National Economy.
68. Philip Hanson, Property Rights in the New Phase of Reforms, in MILESTONES,
supra note 25, at 425-26.
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Ryzhkov plan. Nevertheless, a Soviet draft of basic principles applica-
ble to destatization and privatization was published in early 1991.19
While the Soviets took rather ambiguous and ambivalent posi-
tions with respect to their reforms, the Russian Supreme Soviet, for its
part, quickly adopted a decree regulating foreign economic activities
on Russian territory.7" The decree, coming shortly after the declara-
tion of Russian sovereignty, contained a commitment to seek foreign
investment in Russia. It represented an initial, preliminary attempt to
get beyond the Soviet-era Joint Venture Decree, which had failed to
attract serious investment. It was also the first real effort to use for-
eign capital as political leverage with the Soviet Union.
In October 1990, President Gorbachev moved quickly to answer
the Russian opening and to convince the international community that
the Soviet Union intended to be progressive. He signed a decree on
"Foreign Investment in the USSR. ' 71 The USSR Foreign Investment
Decree authorized independent foreign capital investment in the So-
viet Union. Foreign companies were no longer required to find a So-
viet partner. They could invest in any of the enterprise forms
permissible under Soviet law at that time. The decree also established
the crucial principle that foreign companies would not be subject to
less favorable conditions than those faced by Soviet entities. Finally,
it relaxed the rules under which profits could be taken out of the So-
viet Union in hard currency.
In mid-summer 1991, the increasingly antagonistic political situa-
tion between Russia and the Soviet Union, and between Presidents
Yeltsin and Gorbachev, overtook economic and legal developments.
Nevertheless, less than two months before the fateful coup attempt of
August 1991, Russia enacted a Law on Foreign Investment in the
RSFSR7z and a Law on Privatization. The two laws, adopted within
69. Proekt" Osnovy zakonodatel'stva Soiuza SSR i respublik o razgosudarstrenii
sobstvennosti i privatizatsii predpriatii, EKoNo. niA i zstzN', no. 7, Feb. 1991, at 18-19.
70. Ob osnovnykh printsipakh osushchestvleniia vnesheekonomicheskoi deiatel'nosti
na territorii RSFSR [Decree on Basic Principles for Conducting Foreign Economic Activ-
ity on the Territory of the RSFSR], Sovy KAr Rossiu, July 20, 1990, at 1.
71. Ob inostrannykh investitisiiakh v SSSR [USSR Foreign Investment Decree],
Vedomosti SSSR, Oct. 26, 1990, Issue 44, Item 944. See Jonathan Lyons, Gorbachev De-
cree Opens Door to Freer Foreign Investment, RErrER LImR. REP., Oct. 26, 1990, available
in LEXIS, World Library, Reuter file.
72. Zakon ob innostrannikh investitsijakh v RSFSR [Law on Foreign Investments in
the RSFSR], Vedemosti RSFSR, July 4, 1991, 1991, Issue 29, Item 1008, reprinted in Eng-
lish in 31 LILM. 397 (1992).
73. Zakon o privatizatsii gosudarstvennikh i munitsipal'nikh predpriatii v RSFSR,
[Russian Law on Privatization], Vedemosti RSFSR, July 3, 1991. See Russian Parliament
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one day of each other at the beginning of July 1991, represented trans-
parently progressive steps toward complete economic transformation
in Russia. Immediately thereafter, on July 5, 1991, the USSR
Supreme Soviet adopted its own "Fundamentals of Legislation on
Foreign Investment in the USSR."74 The Soviet Union would dissolve
before it could further offset (or complement) the Russian laws.
The proximity of the Russian laws on foreign investment and
privatization demonstrated, among other things, that the Russian Par-
liament considered the two laws to be of a piece. Of course, neither
could have been adopted without the strong backing of President
Yeltsin. On the other hand, the "war of laws" with the Soviet Union,
the desire to assert Russian sovereignty at every opportunity, and the
need to seduce the international community away from President
Gorbachev, certainly pushed the Russian Parliament beyond what it
could have accomplished in a less chaotic environment. Overtures to
foreign capital had become politically necessary within Russia. That
the laws progressed further than what the lawmakers really wanted (in
the absence of the Soviet threat) was borne out in 1993 by the aggres-
sive attempts by the same lawmakers to roll back the privatization and
investment initiatives.
IV. Political Context of Privatization
Politics both deepen and frustrate economic and legal debates. If
economics is a science of scarcity (the "dismal science," as Thomas
Carlyle called it), then politics is surely no science at all, but merely a
laboratory of contrary ideas and conflicting goals, an "art of the possi-
ble" in Bismarck's words. While this article suggests one reason for
the remarkable resistance of the privatization program to political
forces in Russia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian
politics of privatization have passed through two distinct stages. The
first stage, the struggle against the enemy without, lasted openly from
the Russian declaration of sovereignty in June 1990 through Decem-
Passes Privatisation Bill, RErrER NEws REP., July 3, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Li-
brary, Reuter file.
74. The purpose behind "fundamentals" of legislation was to provide a framework to
facilitate the adoption of more or less uniform laws on a subject in each of the republics of
the former Soviet Union. For instance, in the area of foreign investment, the Soviet Union
had seen uniformity crumble. Apart from Russia's foreign investment law, several other
Soviet republics had already adopted their own laws on foreign investment. Iwo of the
most significant were the Lithuanian Foreign Investment Act of December 29, 1990, and
the Foreign Investment Law of January 17, 1991, of the Kazakh Republic. See Zakono-
datelstvo i ekonomika, no. 14, 1991.
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ber 1991 when the Soviet Union disappeared as a political entity. The
second stage may be called the battle against the enemy within. This
stage, which has lasted from December 1991 through the present, fea-
tures the conservative forces in Russia battling against the forces of
reform. Notwithstanding the number of enterprises that have been
privatized in Russia, reports still circulate about efforts to stop the
program entirely7 5
A. Yeltsin's Challenge - The Enemy Without
On May 29, 1990, Boris Yeltsin was elected to chair the Supreme
Soviet of the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation declared
sovereignty on June 14, 1990. Yeltsin made it clear from the outset
that he intended to support radical economic reform in Russia, despite
the more conservative line espoused by Gorbachev and Prime Minis-
ter Ryzhkov. Though the Soviets had rejected the diluted reforms of
the Abalkin Commission, Yeltsin and Gorbachev agreed, at the begin-
ning of August 1990, to attempt to compromise their differences over
economic policy. They charged the Shatalin working group to pro-
pose a blueprint for economic reform by September 1990. This coop-
eration represented a hiatus from the fierce political struggle between
Yeltsin and Gorbachev.
By September 11, 1990, shortly after the USSR's Supreme Soviet
had begun to study the 500-day plan, Prime Minister Ryzhkov de-
nounced the plan and threatened to resign if it was adopted.
Gorbachev, while not publicly supporting Ryzhkov, resorted, as men-
tioned above, to his own Presidential Plan for reform, thereby refus-
ing to adopt the more radical proposals of the 500-day plan. Yeltsin
persisted in his more progressive course, still contending that Russia
would find its own road to recovery. Finally, on October 31, 1990, the
500-day plan was adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Fed-
eration. The period of potential compromise over the course of eco-
nomic reform had ended abruptly.
Politics began to dominate discourse over economic planning in
the first half of 1991. Yeltsin became preoccupied with his efforts to
broaden his base of popular support further by running for RSFSR
president. The election took place in June 1991. Yeltsin won victory
with 57.3 percent of the votes cast on the first ballot. Nikolai
75. John Lloyd, Praise Hayek and Pass the Ammunition, LoNDor REvIEw OF BooKs,
Feb. 24,1994, at 17. See also Warning on Russian Economy, WALL Sr. J., Sept. 12,1994, at
A13.
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Ryzhkov, who had resigned as Soviet Prime Minister, came in second
with 16.85 percent of the vote.76 Although many issues came to the
forefront in the election, not the least of which was Yeltsin's popular
support regardless of his policies, the election can be viewed, in part,
as a referendum on the different approaches to economic reform pro-
posed by the two most successful candidates.
As described above, the Russian Parliament acted quickly after
Yeltsin's election to adopt laws on the subjects of foreign investment
and privatization. The second half of 1991 saw the development of a
comprehensive economic reform plan, the appointment of young, re-
form economists to put the plan together,77 and the granting to Yeltsin
of the power to regulate the economy by decree. The deregulation of
prices, perhaps the most symbolic and socially painful of the reform
measures, took place on January 2, 1992. Reforms began, during a
speech on October 28, 1991, with Yeltsin's promises of "concrete re-
sults by the fall of 1992." 78 Notwithstanding the mandate that Yeltsin
drew from his election to the Russian presidency, his reform plans met
instant and aggressive opposition from "patriotic" nationalists and
neo-communists.79
B. Parliament's Response - The Enemy Within
Since early 1992, the battle has been pitched between Yeltsin's
reformers, backed by well-known Western advisers, and the conserva-
tive, or simply anti-reform, forces that identify with the nationalists
(led by some combination of Ruslan Khasbulatov, Aleksandr Rutskoi,
and Vladimir Zhirinovsky) and the industrialists (led by Viktor
Chernomyrdin, Arkady Volsky, and Vladimir Shumeiko). A major
symbolic setback for the reformers occurred in June 1992 when
Shumeiko and Chernomyrdin were appointed to top government
posts.8 0 Their appointments were viewed in the West as a major con-
cession to the anti-reform forces. A second clear suggestion of the
direction of reform came in December 1992 when the Parliament re-
76. DUNLOP, THE RIsE OF RUSSIA AND THE FALL OF THE SovIET EMPIRE 35 (1993).
77. "At the beginning of September [1991], [Yeltsin's] aide Gennadi Burbulis invited
Shokhin and Gaidar to Dacha No. 15 in Arkhangelskoye, just west of Moscow, to draft
proposals for economic reform in a new, independent Russia." Steven Erlanger, Reform
School, N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 29, 1992, sec. 6 (Magazine), at 40, 78.
78. Serge Schmemann, Yeltsin is Telling Russians to Brace for Sharp Reform, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 29, 1991, at Al, A12.
79. John Lloyd, Yeltsin's Perilous Balancing Act, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1992, at 10.
80. Shumeiko was named first deputy prime minister and Chernomyrdin was made
vice-premier for energy.
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jected Yegor Gaidar as Prime Minister and chose, over Yeltsin's oppo-
sition, Viktor Chernomyrdin.
The strong victory in the April 1992 referendum regarding the
course of reform seemed to renew Yeltsin's mandate, yet the forces
aligned against him in Parliament continued to obstruct every reform
initiative. Full-scale privatization officially began on October 1, 1992,
pursuant to the 1992 privatization program. A planned 1993 privatiza-
tion program was never adopted by Parliament. Instead, initiatives
were passed in Parliament with the intent of upsetting the whole
privatization regime. Anatoly Chubais miraculously managed to keep
the course of privatization fairly steady, notwithstanding challenges at
the federal level, from Parliament, as well as at the local level, such as
in Moscow.
At the federal level, President Yeltsin signed a decree on May 8,
1993, aiming to clarify and expand the use of privatization vouchers
and to expedite privatization in general.81 In mid-July 1993, Parlia-
ment acted precipitously to undermine Yeltsin's decree and called the
whole privatization program into question. Parliament nullified the
May 8th decree, pending its review by the Constitutional Court.- In
addition, Parliament tried to wrest control of state property from
Chubais's State Property Committee and to authorize agencies under
Parliament's direct supervision to take over the administration of the
property-'
Then, the conflicting laws and decrees took hold. President Yelt-
sin issued a decree on July 26, 1993, with the aim of reinstating the
May 8th decree.s4 Parliament then nullified the July 26th decree by
issuing its own decree on August 6, 1993. Parliament was still awaiting
the decision of the Constitutional Court regarding Yeltsin's May 8th
decree. Yeltsin again acted on August 10, 1993 to reassert control
over the privatization regime with yet another decree.Y5 One can only
81. Decree No. 640 of May 8, 1993 on "State Guarantees of the Right of Russian
Citizens to Participate in Privatization." See Roswell B. Perkins and William NV. Jarosz,
Western Investors Weigh Strategies for Entering Russian Privatization Process, RutssA ANm




84. Decree No. 1108 of July 26, 1993 on "Additional Measures to Protect the Right of
Russia's Citizens to Participate in Privatization." See Briefs, RussLAN COaM Oi, .rH
Bus. L. REP., Aug. 23, 1993, available in LEXS, World Library, RCBLR file.
85. Decree No. 1238 of August 10, 1993 on "Protecting the Right of Russian Federa-
tion Citizens to Participate in Privatization." Id. The text of the decree No. 123S vas re-
printed in English in New Presidential Decree on Rights of Citizens to Participate in
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imagine the political fallout that would have occurred during this pe-
riod if the conservative members of Parliament could have identified
significant abuse of the privatization program by foreign investors.86
The fact that such abuses did not occur, partly because of the lack of
involvement of foreigners in the process, may have saved privatiza-
tion. Yeltsin could still argue, however, that he had the mandate of
the people.
By September 1993, the Russian Parliament had demonstrated
further its obstructionist intent. They couched objections to the priva-
tization program in all manner of rationales, such as that it was a sell-
out of the country to foreign buyers. On September 21, 1993, Presi-
dent Yeltsin dissolved the Parliament. He immediately set out to
reestablish the reform course by passing several economic decrees and
submitted a draft of the Constitution which, if adopted, would ensure
his power as president to regulate the economy by decree. That win-
dow of opportunity may now have closed as well, in light of the elec-
tion results of December 12, 1993. 7
The movement against the economic program outlined by
Shokhin and Gaidar in Arkhangelskoye has not abated. Persistent
calls for a change in the direction of reform continue to be heard. The
virtues of central-planning continue to be extolled in some corners
and privatization is still under attack. Anatoly Chubais insisted that
voucher privatization would continue into 1994 and end on schedule
at the end of June 1994, when the vouchers lost their validity. He was
right. Will privatization come under greater attack if foreigners take a
larger role in the process once the cash auctions get underway?
At the beginning of October 1990, Shatalin, still convinced that
the Soviet Union would adopt his 500-day plan, referred to the powers
that would be required to carry out the economic transformation of
Soviet society. His words, meant to justify the emergency powers
Privatization, BBC MONITORING SERVICE - U.S.S.R., Aug. 13,1993, available in WL, INT-
NEWS File.
86. For instance, it would have been very damaging to the privatization program if a
sale of valuable state assets at an unfairly low price could have been uncovered. Such an
incident occurred in Hungary in connection with the sale of the Hungarhotels to a consor-
tium of foreign investors. See Hungary: Setting the Pace Through Pragmatic Privatization,
M&A EUROPE, NoviDec. 1990, available in LEXIS, World Library, ARCNWS File. The
deal had to be declared invalid and Hungary was required by its own political workings to
create a new state property agency to avoid the occurrence of similar incidents.
87. The Duma rejected the Chubais program for post-voucher privatization this sum-
mer. See Russian Fund Launched, PRIVATIZATION INT'L, Sept. 1994, available in LEXIS,
World Library. Many of their objections centered on the enhanced position intended by
the program to be accorded to foreign investors.
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given to Mikhail Gorbachev, have been forgotten in the debates over
the similarly broad powers granted to President Yeltsin to legislate in
the economic area. "We are not talking simply about presidential
powers, but about presidential-tsarist powers."-' It is especially ironic
that Shatalin should mention Czarist authority at a time when Soviet
society was supposed to be moving toward increased openness. His
remarks carried the weight not only of political reality, but of histori-
cal determination as well.
V. Historical Context of Privatization
Foreign participation in the Russian economy, through greenfield
investment or the privatization program, requires some attention to
the historical context. The historical context provides a seductive ex-
planation for many of the economic, legal, and political conflicts re-
garding foreign investment in Russia. The Russian "problem" with
foreigners, particularly Westerners, has so preoccupied Russians, par-
ticularly writers and philosophers, that it even has a name,
"zapadnichestvso," loosely meaning the "Western thing."s 9 Western
scholars have answered with thousands of pages of speculation on the
origins and nature of the "Western thing." As a subject, it vastly ex-
ceeds the few paragraphs that follow. With respect to its importance
and uniqueness, try to think of an equivalent phenomenon elsewhere.
A Russian philosopher and friend of Aleksandr Pushkin, Peter
Chaadayev, wrote a "philosophical letter" in 1829 in which he dispar-
aged Russia and advocated a deep conversion to European culture
and civilization. Chaadayev wrote:
[o]ne of the worst features of our unique civilization is that we have
not yet discovered truths that have elsewhere become truisms, even
among nations that in many respects are far less advanced than we
are. It is the result of our never having walked side by side with
other nations; we belong to none of the great families of mankind;
we are neither of the West nor of the East, and we possess the tradi-
tions of neither. Somehow divorced from time, we have not been
touched by the universal education of mankind. 90
The Czarist authorities immediately declared him insane, placed him
under arrest, and forbade further publication of his works. Some
88. Gorbachev's Guru Sas Reform Will Be "Cruel", FiN. TiMES, OzL 1, 1990, at 2.
89. "Zapadnichestvo Kak Problema Russkovo Puti,'" VOPROSY FILosost 4 (1993)
(on file with author).
90. PER Y. CHAADAY-.EV, PHLosoPHIcAL LzrmS AND APOLOOY OF A MADMAN
34 (Mary-Barbara Zeldin trans., 1969).
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trace to Chaadayev's life and writings the particular virulence of the
split between the so-called Slavophiles, those guarding an aggressively
nationalist view of Russia, and Westernizers, who believe that Russia
must learn from the West.
Long before 1829, however, Russia feared that it had been for-
ever overtaken by the technologies and accumulated wealth of Eu-
rope. Peter the Great tried to correct the balance in the 18th century
by fierce incorporation of Western methods and processes. Even
before Peter the Great, in the early 1600's, the Czar Boris Godunov
had turned to the West for greater economic contacts. Efforts such as
these accomplished some measure of openness, but eventually led to
reassertions of intense nationalism and backlashes against foreigners.
So the cycle went, and apparently it continues. This is the reason that
many scholars of Russian history viewed the durability of the per-
estroika reforms with great skepticism.
The perspective of the West, however, must also be incorporated
to gain a better insight into the Russian dynamic with the West. The
West's motives for enabling numerous and enduring contacts with
Russia have usually been summarized by references to economic per-
spectives (Russia viewed as a land of enormous consumer potential)
or to security concerns. These motivations are real enough, and they
are not new. More basic though, and perhaps the real reason behind
the appeal of the ultra-nationalists in Russia, is the perceived Western
arrogance about its own cultural and philosophical superiority. Russia
is a tabula rasa on which to try out ideas that haven't received their
due here, or new ideas that require a proving ground. Russians admit
their fallibility, but not their inferiority.
Russians have longed to discover the key to the universe and
have turned to the West for insight during several historical periods.
Yet, they exhibited real impatience with the laborious methods and
structures of Western economic and cultural processes. 91 Westerners,
for their part were only too quick to flatter themselves that they could
solve Russia's problems. Neither side appreciated the incongruity
(and perhaps futility) of these repeated cultural and social grafts.
Marxism-Leninism itself blatantly exemplifies the inadequacy of
Western approaches to Russian problems. Are Professors Sachs and
Aslund only the most recent examples of this phenomenon? Will Bo-
ris Yeltsin soon go the way of Boris Godunov? Are Rutskoi and
91. JAMES H. BILLINGTON, Ti ICON AND THE AxE: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF
RUSSIAN CULTURE 88 (1966).
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Zhirinovsky going to be the ultimate beneficiaries of this paradox? In
any case, did the West have a choice?
'With this background of zapadnichestvo in mind, the 19th century
should be described in a bit more detail. At that time, the Russian
economy began to enter the modem commercial world, only a genera-
tion or so behind the West. Zapadnichestvo acquired an especially
economic nuance in the 19th century. In 1863, the Minister of Finance
under Alexander II wrote that if:
only with the help of [foreign] loans the plant owner maintains the
operations of his plant, the trader increases the volume of his trade,
and the landowner improves his farm, then no matter how large the
portion by which their benefits are reduced to pay the [foreign]
bank, the aid that they receive will clearly enrich the country with
new production and will also increase the revenues of the [state]
treasury.
92
This is exactly what is being said today by Yeltsin's reformers. It
has been argued that Russians needed to turn to foreign capital be-
cause of the scarcity of capital in Russia (due partly to a failure to
develop fully the legal structures required by investment) and because
of the "timidity [nereshitel'nost'] with which native capitalists ap-
proach new enterprises."93 Nevertheless, foreign investment faced
numerous obstacles in Russia throughout the 19th century. Many ob-
stacles were legal in nature, including bans on investment in some
industries, onerous registration requirements, shareholding require-
ments, and similar limitations. Other restrictions came unpredictably
from the will of the Czar himself. A foreign company would simply be
required to cease operations for any reason or for no reason if the
Czar so ordered.94 These restrictions existed into the 20th century.
The erection and maintenance of such restrictions against for-
eigners took place in the context of a general debate over the need
for, and control over, foreign influence. Economic historians regard
the period from 1905 to 1914, namely right up to World War I and the
1917 Revolution, as a period of relative strengthening of the Russian
economy and increases in economic relations with foreigners. The
disastrous economic consequences of the war and the abolition of pri-
vate property and nationalization that took place under the Bol-
sheviks arrested and reversed the trend. Lenin himself used the
92. THOMAS C. OWnxN, THE CORPORATION UNDER RussrAN L.w, 1S--1917: A
STUDY IN CZARIST ECONOMIC Poucy 118 (1991).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 120.
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economic benchmarks of the period from 1912 to 1913 as measures to
judge the economic performance of socialism during the War Commu-
nism period and during the period of the New Economic Policy
(NEP).95
The NEP period served as a model, often more as ideological jus-
tification than economic theory, for many of the perestroika reforms.
In early 1921, the Soviet economy had reached such a low point that
Lenin decided to abandon the policies of strict nationalization and
centralization that had characterized the so-called War Communism
period. He began to free up agriculture and legalized limited free
trade. In May 1921, Lenin revoked the decree nationalizing all small-
scale industry. In July 1921, Russians were given the authority to or-
ganize small industrial enterprises. During the NEP period, which
lasted until the late 1920s, the economy was characterized by a mix of
activities, "with an overwhelmingly private agriculture, plus legalized
private trade and small-scale private manufacturing.
9 6
Lenin also reversed policy on foreign investment during this pe-
riod. Even in 1921 and 1922, discussion of opening doors to Wes-
terners evinced many nationalist reactions, which history has taught to
expect and current events bear out once more. Nationalists asserted:
"We chased out our own capitalists, and now we call in foreign capital-
ists."'97 Nonetheless, a decree authorizing the granting of foreign con-
cessions within the Soviet Union was adopted on March 8, 1923.98
The decree resembled in many respects the Joint Venture Decree of
January 1987 that ushered in the changed attitude toward foreign in-
vestment during perestroika.99
Lenin's opening to foreigners rankled the nationalists dispropor-
tionately relative to the opportunities it created. Very little actual
capital infusion took place during the 1920s in comparison to the size
of the economy." As Stalin began to consolidate power in the late
1920s and early 1930s, the period of foreign concessions died out
along with the whole NEP experiment. Instead, Stalin imposed an
economic plan, implemented from above, designed to construct "so-
95. See generally, ALEC NoVE, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE U.S.S.R. (1976).
96. Id. at 86.
97. Id. at 89.
98. See Adam J. Albin, Comment, Joint Venture Law in the Soviet Union: The 1920s
and the 1980s, 9 NW. J. INr'L L. & Bus. 633 (1989).
99. See generally Id.
100. "In 1924-5 only 4,260 workers were engaged in thirteen significant 'concession-
enterprises.' All sixty-eight concessions which existed in 1928 accounted for 0.6 per cent of
industrial output." Nove, supra note 95, at 89.
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cialism in one country," a doctrine that began to gain currency in 1925
and 1926. The phrase evokes impatience with, and fear of, foreigners,
as well as the belief in a true Russian destiny that can only be attained
without foreigners or foreign influence.
VI. Yeltsin's Privatization Programs
How have the influences discussed above been reflected in the
actual provisions of Yeltsin's privatization programs? What restric-
tions have faced potential foreign investors in Russia's privatization
effort? 10 1 If the restrictions are few, then, all else being equal, one
might suppose that investment would increase as a result of the priva-
tization effort itself.10 2 If investment has not increased through the
privatization program, the reasons for the failure should be examined.
Or, are those questions typically "Western" ones? Should the real
question be instead, "how has privatization lasted this long amidst a
general retrenchment, and achieved, to date, the transfer of well over
half of existing state assets to private firms and individuals?"
101. A rough listing of the principal legislative and executive acts directly affezting for-
eign participation in the Russian privatization program would include the following: the
Law on Privatization of July 3, 1991, as amended on June 5, 1992; the Law on Forcien
Investment of July 4,1991; the Law on Nominal Privatization Accounts and Investments in
the RSFSR of July 31, 1991; the Fundamental Provisions Concerning the Program of Priva.
tization of State and Municipal Enterprises in the Russian Federation in 1992, adopted
December 29, 1991; the State Program of Privatization of State and Municipally Oined
Enterprises of the Russian Federation for 1992, adopted June 11, 1992; the Decree on the
Completion of Work Involving Foreign Investment of September 27, 1993; the State Pro-
gram for Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in the Russian Federation for
1994, adopted December 24, 1993; and the Fundamental Provisions of the State Program
of Privatization of State and Municipally Owned Enterprises of the Russian Federation
after July 1, 1994, adopted July 22, 1994.
It must be emphasized that the foregoing list is highly selective. Numerous other laws
and decrees, including laws involving currency, securities, banking, trade, ownerhip, and
land would have to be listed to provide a complete picture of the legal environment for
foreign investment. Such a listing is beyond the scope of this article, however, because of
the limitation here to convey a less complicated view of the nature of restrictions facing
foreign investors. A more detailed description of the entire privatization process can be
found elsewhere. See, eg., FRYDmAN ET At., THE PmvATmizOrz Pocrss iri RusSIA,
UK.Amn-E AND TsE BALTrc STATES (1993) and Russell H. Pollack, Andrew A. Bernstein,
and Lydia L Minakova, Foreign Investment in Russia: The Perspective of the Russian Gor-
ernment and Problems Faced by Western Investors, 654 PLIICOMM 507 (1993). Of course,
most sources, except the popular and financial press, will not include coverage of the 1994
Privatization Program nor of the Post-Voucher Program adopted on July 22, 1994.
102. "Research shows that privatization has almost always caused an increase in invest-
ment and innovation." Mary M. Shirley, The What, Why, and How of Privatization: A
World Bank Perspective, 60 FoRDHAm L. RE%,. 23, 27 (1992).
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The following comments on actual legislation will delineate the
interaction between foreign investment and privatization. They will
demonstrate that the rhetoric of openness to foreigners necessitated
by political expediency had not been realized in the privatization laws
until it was too late. Nonetheless, it must be borne in mind that the
failure to match rhetoric and statute with respect to foreign capital has
permitted the survival of the privatization program as a whole.
The burden of the past and the realistic attitudes of Yeltsin's eco-
nomic team kept the Russian privatization program from being aimed
principally at attracting foreign investment. Instead, its primary goal
was to transfer as much state property into private Russian hands in as
short a period of time as possible. The program was viewed as a mea-
sure of democratic reform more than a measure of economic reform.
Moreover, there was an element of "expropriation in reverse;" that is,
property had been confiscated in 1917, and it was to be returned to
the workers and small landowners in the course of the Second Russian
Revolution. Such property could not, therefore, be sold to foreigners
without threatening the privatization program as a whole.
The confluence of (i) democratic objectives and the concern for
returning property to Russians with (ii) nationalistic fears of foreign-
ers left very little room for the foreign investor in the scheme of priva-
tization. The foreign investor was not forgotten entirely, but was
certainly demoted. Of course, such demotion ran contrary to the
goals of paying real value for the privatizing enterprises (Russians
would be able to pay only in devalued rubles) and of replenishing the
state treasury with hard currency. Those objectives, however are typi-
cally Western. They might characterize privatizations in Britain or
France, or even in Mexico, but they do not ring true in Moscow.
103
Early voucher privatization. The Russian Foreign Investment
Law provided expressly for foreign participation in the privatization
program."° The details of the participation were left to be worked
out in other legislation. Instead, most of the relevant provisions fo-
cused on the requirements that a foreign investor use the currency of
the Soviet Union in privatization transactions. It set forth preemp-
tively the terms on which foreign investors could exchange hard cur-
103. Of course, while the objectives may not ring true in Moscow, they may admittedly
make the most pure economic sense.
104. Article 37 of the Russian Foreign Investment Law. See Jonathan H. Hines,
Amendments to the Russian Foreign Investment Law Offer Stability of Legislation; Address
Ruble Issues, RussiAN AND CoriMoNwEALTH Bus. L. REP., Aug. 21, 1992, available in
LEXIS, World Library, RCBLR file.
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rency for rubles. The provisions clearly implied that the foreign
investor would not only be asked to pay real value for state assets, but
that the currency exchange would be a costly one and, in all likeli-
hood, not made at a commercial rate.
The Law on Privatization simply did not address foreign invest-
ment. It did not set down any provisions to restrict foreign invest-
ment, nor did it lay down procedures for foreigners to participate in
the privatization process. The substantial amendments to the Law on
Privatization that were adopted on June 5, 1992, when Russia had
come fully out from under the Soviet heel, also did not address foreign
investment. The purpose of privatization was to "transform the basis
of ownership of the means of production."10 -5 Foreigners, as stated
above, were not viewed as integral to that purpose. Moreover, they
were probably viewed as contrary to that purpose because the trans-
formation was sought within Russia and not modeled on a class of
foreign owners.
Six days after the amendments to the Law on Privatization were
adopted, the Supreme Soviet of Russia adopted the 1992 Privatization
Program. The program established, in much greater detail than the
Law on Privatization, the procedures for the privatization of state and
municipal enterprises. The principal objectives of the program
sounded more like those typically associated with privatization pro-
grams, including the attraction of foreign investment.1L6
The 1992 Privatization Program authorized foreigners to partici-
pate in all aspects of privatization under the same conditions as those
applicable to Russian investors, except with respect to small-scale
privatizations and privatizations in the natural resources sector. This
would have been immensely advantageous to foreign investors had
share distributions of privatizing companies been made without pref-
erence. Foreigners, however, were not allowed to participate in the
early stages of share acquisition of an enterprise, but were limited in
effect to minority participation through auction, tender, or investment
bidding.107 Otherwise, foreigners were authorized expressly to partici-
105. Law on Privatization, supra note 73, pmbL
106. 1992 Privatization Program, art. 1, introduction.
107. 1992 Privatization Program, art. 8.1. It should be noted that the 1992 Privatization
Program outlined a four-step procedure for the sale of shares in a "commercialized" state
enterprise, "commercialized" referring to the process by which a state enterprise is con-
verted into an open-type joint stock company, pursuant to Decree no. 721 of July 1, 1992
on "Commercialization of State Enterprises." The four steps are: (i) free distribution of
employee preferred shares to workers in certain enterprises; (ii) sale of common shares to
employees in a closed subscription; (iii) sale of common shares in a voucher auction; and
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pate in all other aspects of privatization under the same conditions as
those applicable to Russian investors. The program expressly tried to
preempt the imposition of any other legal limit to foreign
participation. 08
The relegation of foreigners to a minority stake in the privatiza-
tion process surprised both foreigners and, to a certain extent, the re-
formist factions within the Russian political system. It had been
anticipated that foreigners would be given a generous stake in certain
privatizing enterprises, particularly the large, attractive ones, specifi-
cally to generate hard currency for the state treasury. The distributive
priority was given to Russians, however, partly as a result of the need
to satisfy workers and other political constituencies. This Russian pri-
ority, understandable both as a political compromise and as a way to
engender a propertied, democratic class of citizens within Russia,
nonetheless operated to frustrate foreigners who were unable, except
indirectly, to purchase control blocks of shares in the privatizing com-
panies.10 9 Were it not for the cultural fears of "selling-out to foreign-
ers," the goals of democratization through privatization and attraction
of substantial foreign capital would not have been in conflict.
The political battle to keep control blocks out of the hands of
foreigners was joined as well by the large Russian industrialists who
aimed to maintain control of enterprises during privatization, perhaps
with an eye to later "selling out" to foreigners themselves.110 Conse-
quently, most foreign companies have avoided the privatization re-
gime altogether. Instead, companies wait to negotiate deals with
(iv) sale of common shares in a commercial or investment tender. 1992 Privatization Pro-
gram, Article 5. Thus, foreign bidders were relegated to the last stage of the share distribu-
tion, usually resulting in a maximum shareholding of about 20%.
108. Article 8.1 of the 1992 Privatization Program stated "[n]o other restrictions [other
than those mentioned] on foreign participation in privatization shall be imposed."
109. Another practical obstacle to foreign investment in the privatization program
comes from the inability to negotiate the sale of shares with one buyer. The prohibition of
negotiated deals and the decision to make every deal an open competition in either an
auction or an investment tender were intended to reduce the likelihood of fraud. Unfortu-
nately, forcing sophisticated foreign investors who are quite used to such negotiated deals
into open competitions works to reduce the amount of foreign investment in the program.
110. The failure to wrest control of these enterprises from the nomenklatura has, of
course, resulted in no small amount of criticism within Russia. It has also magnified the
likelihood of abuse by enterprise managers. For example, the auction in January 1994 of
shares of the Gorky Automobile Factory, or GAZ, in Nizhny Novgorod had to be declared
invalid on February 22, 1994, because it was discovered that the director had used 46.5
billion rubles (about $28.6 million) in state-issued credits to buy up shares in the privatizing
company through a number of sham companies. See Celestine Bohlen, A New Russia:
Now Thrive the Swindlers, N.Y. TimEs, March 17, 1994, at Al.
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workers and management after the initial distribution of shares in the
privatization framework is complete. An obvious disadvantage to
waiting, however, is the risk that another neutral investor or a compet-
itor will somehow get in the door first during the privatization stage.
In light of such restrictions and other limitations, the privatization
program has basically failed in its promise of welcoming foreign in-
vestment. In fact, numerous technical, legal, and circumstantial obsta-
cles existed for the foreign investor. First, because the Russian
government was compelled to adopt the legal framework of a market
economy relatively overnight, many of the new and old laws and de-
crees conflicted. The tax system, currency regulations, and securities
laws, for example, all conflicted to one degree or another with the
privatization program. Such conflicts, while not insurmountable by
the venturesome investor, worked to handicap investment and always
created legal uncertainty.111
Second, foreign investors encountered enormous problems in ac-
quiring the information needed to study investment opportunities.
The Russians have tried to address this problem in several ways. A
decree by President Yeltsin in December 1991 created a Committee
for Foreign Investment within the Ministry of Economics and Fi-
nance.112 It was the task of the Committee to attract and facilitate
foreign investment both within and outside of the general privatiza-
tion program. The Committee, however, did not function particularly
well, notwithstanding an enormous amount of press regarding its ac-
tivities. The Russians also recruited various Western professional ad-
visers to help them attract foreign investment. Again, while such
efforts met with great fanfare, they produced little in the way of con-
crete results.
The Committee for Foreign Investment was finally terminated
because of its lackluster performance and replaced in September 1992
by a new agency, the Russian Agency for International Cooperation
and Development. This new agency was to act independently of the
Economic and Finance Ministries. Yeltsin also gave it more authority
to coordinate state policy broadly in the areas of aid and investment
coming into Russia. Most recently, it was transferred to the jurisdic-
111. Many of these conflicts are discussed in Perkins & Jarosz, supra note 81.
112. Decree on the "Committee for Foreign Investment of the RSFSR Ministry of Eco-
nomics and Finance," December 14, 1991, discussed in Vneshnyaya Torgoylya, Russia:
Foreign Capital Investment-Interview with Lconid Grigoriev, Chairman of Foreign Invest-
ment Committee, REuTERs IN~o. SERvicEs, June 20, 1992, at 2, available in WLINT-
NEWS File.
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tion of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations.113 It is too early
to tell whether the new agency will really fulfill its mandate. Statistics
disclosed at the beginning of 1994 on the amount of foreign invest-
ment in Russia were not encouraging. 114 More recent statistics, how-
ever, show a marked increase in foreign investment for 1994.
The political turmoil, as described above, precluded adoption of
the 1993 privatization program by the Russian Parliament. Why was
agreement on a program not reached? Even though the draft of the
1993 privatization program did not mention foreign investment among
its principal objectives, it would have significantly broadened the
rights of foreign investors in the privatization program.115 Such being
the case, it ignited the xenophobia of the conservatives. The provi-
sions of the 1993 privatization program relating to foreign investment
eventually carried over in substantial part to the 1994 privatization
program, but the 1994 program was adopted by Presidential decree
only after Yeltsin had dissolved Parliament.
A. Late Voucher Privatization
After the dissolution of Parliament in September 1993, President
Yeltsin had a short period to enact economic decrees without signifi-
cant impediments. Two significant decrees adopted during this period
include a decree of September 27, 1993 on the "Completion of Work
Regarding Foreign Investment," and a decree enacting and putting
into effect, as of January 1, 1994, the new privatization program. 116
113. Decree on the "Structure of Federal Bodies of Executive Authority" of January 10,
1994. The text of the decree was broadcast on Jan. 12, 1994. Yeltsin's Decree on the Struc-
ture of Federal Bodies of Executive Authority, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS,
Jan. 12, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, BBCSB file.
114. According to ITAR-TASS, Russian Government authorities reported that foreign
investment in 1993 in Russia exceeded $400 million, while in 1992 only $290 million was
invested from abroad. The Agency for International Cooperation and Development re-
ports that almost 12,000 entities in Russia are owned in part or in whole by foreigners, yet
the aggregate share in industrial output for such enterprises is only about 2.5% of the total.
Viktor Petrenko, Foreign Investments into Russian Economy on the Rise, TASS, March 9,
1994. For the sake of comparison, roughly the same amount was invested by foreigners in
Poland in 1993. See Thomas T. Vogel, Poland Gets Generous Pact to Cut Debt, WALL ST.
J., March 14, 1994, at A10. In any case, $400 million annually falls far short of the $20
billion to $40 billion annual figure pegged in the Gaidar reform plan. See Yeltsin Speech to
Concede Low Expectations of West Aid, J. COM., Feb. 23, 1994, at A2.
115. Draft 1993 privatization program, art. 9 (on file with author).
116. 0 sovershenstvovanii raboty s innostrannymi investitsijami [On the Completion of
Work Regarding Foreign Investment], Decree No. 1466 of September 27, 1993, text re-
ported in Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, Moscow News, Oct. 20, 1993,
available in LEXIS, World Library, MOSNWS File, and Decree No. 2284 of December 24,
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Both decrees were adopted by Yeltsin before the new Parliament be-
gan its first legislative session on January 11, 1994.
It can be debated, as it has been in Russia, whether it is necessary
to accord special treatment to foreigners in order to attract their capi-
tal or sufficient to create a level playing field by giving foreign inves-
tors "national treatment." Special treatment has greater potential to
inflame concerns over "sell-outs" and the loss of economic sover-
eignty. Nevertheless, it cannot be ignored that (i) foreign capital is
not an inexhaustible resource, and (ii) fierce competition exists to at-
tract that limited resource, especially due to the recent independence
of countries in Eastern and Central Europe and of the former Soviet
Union.
17
The September 27th decree, directed specifically at foreign in-
vestment, is the next stage in the ongoing efforts by reformers to
amend the Russian Foreign Investment Law. Such efforts have
crested at various moments in the reform process but the law itself
remains unamended. Unsuccessful attempts were made by Western
advisers to suggest amendments to the Committee on Foreign Invest-
ment when it existed. Draft amendments were circulating in the
Supreme Soviet in 1992 and 1993, but the political capital needed to
pass them never existed."'
The September 27th decree builds on the concepts in play regard-
ing amendment of the Russian Foreign Investment Law. First, for a
three-year period from the moment of its adoption, it immunizes any
foreign company or joint venture from application of any unfavorable
law or other normative act which would have a negative impact on the
company or joint venture. 119 Secondly, the decree establishes the im-
1993 on the "State Program for Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in the
Russian Federation," RosSnSKAYA GAZETA, Jan. 4, 1994, at 1.
117. Alexandr Shokhin, the current Economics Minister, addressed these concerns in a
defensive article in NrmAViSINtAYA GAZ=TA on October 31, 1992. He wrote that "[w]orld
experience indicates that a country does not have to create any special concessions to at-
tract direct foreign investments; all that is needed is a lack of discrimination against foreign
investors, a stable economic and political situation, and the appropriate financial infra-
structure .... The state regulation of foreign investments in Russia has as a goal not only
encouraging capital investments from abroad but also safeguarding Russia's economic se-
curity and sovereignty." Alexander Shokhin, Shokhin Updates Policy on Investment Ex-
ports, CuR. DIG. OF THE Posr-SoviEr PRnss, Dec. 9, 1992, at 12.
118. The author worked on several iterations of proposed amendments in 1991 and
1992. For a published report of a draft under consideration in 1992 see Jonathan H. Hines,
Amendments to Russian Foreign Investment Law Offer Stability of Legislation, RussiA AN
ComM oNEAL r Bus. L. REP., available in LEXIS, World Library, RCBLR file.
119. Decree No. 1466, art. 1.
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portant principle that foreign investments are regulated only by fed-
eral laws and Presidential decrees, shielding such investments from
conflicting or less favorable regional or local legislation.12 0 The de-
cree also requires new legislation favorable to foreign investors, the
establishment of free economic zones, and the awarding of
concessions. 21
Finally, the decree directly links foreign investment to the priva-
tization program. It provides that the laws and decrees governing
privatization must be amended to grant foreign investors treatment
equal to that accorded Russian investors in the privatization pro-
gram.122 Overall, however, the decree contemplates the extension to
foreigners of conditions that are more favorable than those available
to Russian companies. Thus, it does not accept the principle that
nothing more than the elimination of discrimination against foreign
investors is needed to promote foreign investment.
President Yeltsin also used the dissolution of Parliament to sign
the decree putting into effect the 1994 Privatization Program. The
1994 program gives every sign, textually at least, of being the last of its
kind. Its main objectives include the "completion of privatization in-
volving the use of privatization checks," the "completion of the priva-
tization of most 'small-scale privatization' facilities," and the
"completion in the main of the privatization of large and medium-
sized enterprises in industry and construction."'2 In contrast even to
the draft of the 1993 program, the 1994 program includes the attrac-
tion of foreign investment as one of its main objectives.
124
In the section treating foreign investment, the 1994 program stip-
ulates that:
[floreign investors can take part in auctions (including check auc-
tions), tenders, and investment tenders, as well as buying privatiza-
tion checks for use as a means of payment in the privatization
120. Id art. 2.
121. Id. art. 3.
122. Id. art. 4. Decree No. 1466 specifically mandates a program to attract foreign capi-
tal to defense industry conversions and requires the preparation of a list of other invest-
ment priorities.
123. 1994 Privatization Program, art. 1 translated in Russian State Privatization Pro-
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process provided that mandatory subsequent notification is given to
the Russian Finance Ministry.125
The principal clarification for foreign investors over prior law was
in the use of the privatization vouchers.126 Many questions had arisen
over whether the vouchers could be obtained by foreigners, on what
terms, and whether they could be used in the privatization process
during the voucher auctions. Prior approval for use of the vouchers
had to be obtained from the Finance Ministry. These uncertainties, in
essence, relegated foreign investors to shares which could be acquired
only after the closed subscription and voucher sales were completed,
usually approximately 20 percent or less of the enterprise capital.
With the adoption of the 1994 program, however, foreigners can now
easily participate in the check auctions themselves, perhaps acquiring
substantially more than 20 percent.127 Broadening participation at the
check auction stage made sense, in part, because the validity period of
privatization vouchers ended on June 30, 1994. The problem is that
the clarification came too late in the voucher privatization process to
create much of a benefit. Auctions are now held on a cash basis only.
A hidden advantage of buying more shares at the auction stage is
that the foreign investor will not be required, thereby, to take on addi-
tional obligations toward the enterprise in the way of investment com-
mitments, maintenance of specific employment levels, maintenance of
certain social facilities, such as schools or housing, or provision of ad-
ditional services. The undertaking of such additional obligations was
often the price for winning in an investment tender. On the other
125. 1994 Privatization Program, art. 10.1 translated in Russian State Privatization Pro-
gram, secs. 7-17, BBC MoNITOPING SERvicE, March 2,1994, available in WIL, INT-NEWS
File.
126. The voucher program was announced in July 1992. Approximately 150 million
vouchers were distributed to Russian citizens. Each voucher had a face value of 10,0&)
rubles and expired at the end of June 1994. The vouchers could be used in a variety of
ways, but they were intended to permit every qualifying Russian citizen to participate di-
rectly in the distribution of state assets by exchanging the voucher for shares in a privatiz-
ing enterprise. See Russia to Hustle Sell-Offs, VALL ST. J., March 2, 1994, at A6.
127. Significant clarification regarding the ability of foreigners to participate in voucher
auctions occurred in the summer of 1993. The Russian Central Bank issued instructions
permitting "non-residents" to purchase rubles in Russia for business and investment pur-
poses, including "privatization deals." See Instruction on "Procedures for Opening and
Keeping by Authorized Banks of Non-Residents' Accounts in Russian Currcncy," art. 2.1,
CoimRsANTr, Aug. 4, 1993. The so-called "I" accounts of non.residents permit foreigners
to use rubles to obtain privatization vouchers. The prior laws and regulations did not
clearly permit this, so foreigners either had to depend on an already established joint ven-
ture or wholly-owned investment in Russia that generated ruble revenue, or they had to
risk obtaining rubles in ways that were not officially permitted under the laws.
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hand, if a foreign investor can acquire a larger stake, more than 20
percent, of an enterprise by combining purchases at a check auction
with an investment tender, some additional obligations may be
acceptable.
Restrictions still remain on foreign investment in certain service
sectors, such as food, small businesses, the defense industry, natural
resource and oil industries, and transport and communication indus-
tries.128 The 1994 privatization program repeats the stipulation that
"no other restrictions on foreign investors' participation in privatiza-
tion" may be imposed.129 Recourse to such defensive language in the
decree speaks for itself.
While the September 27 decree and the 1994 privatization pro-
gram without doubt did much to encourage a positive investment en-
vironment, calls from the nationalist and industrialist political camps
to unwind the privatization program and to stop the "give away," in
short, to end the period of "market romanticism," continued to ensure
that foreigners would not come to the Russian markets to nearly the
level required to achieve a healthy investment climate.130 These same
political camps in the Duma managed to defeat the post-voucher
privatization program offered by Chubais in July 1994.131 The main
reasons offered for voting against the program included, of course, the
concessions made to foreigners, and the continued monopoly of
Chubais and the GKI over important privatization decisions.
B. Post-Voucher Privatization
In a typical gesture of political necessity mixed with arrogance,
President Yeltsin overruled the Duma on July 22, 1994, with respect to
post-voucher privatization. 32 The press reported that Yeltsin was
128. 1994 Privatization Program, supra note 125, art. 10.1.
129. Id.
130. The Russian Government has taken other steps to create a proper environment for
foreign investment, including, for example, the conclusion of bilateral investment treaties
like Investment Incentive Agreement, April 3, 1992, U.S.-Russia, 31 I.L.M. 777, and the
Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, June 17,
1992, U.S.-Russia, 31 I.L.M. 790.
131. Boiko, Post-Voucher Privatization: Program Can Only Hope for the President's
Mercy, CuRR. DIG. oF rH POsT-SoviET Pirnss, Aug. 17, 1994, at 2, available in LEXIS,
World Library, CDSP file.
132. Ukaz Prezidenta RF ot 22 iyulia 1994 n. 1535 "ob osnovnykh polozheniyakh
Gosudarstvennoi programmy privatizatsii gosudarstvennykh i munitsipialnykh predpriatii
b Rossiskoi Federatsii posle 1 iyulia 1994 goda" [Decree of the Russian President of July
22, 1994, no. 1535, on the "Fundamental Provisions of the State Program for Privatization
of State and Municipal Enterprises of the Russian Federation after July 1, 1994."] See
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forced to make certain "unspecified" compromises with conservative
Parliamentarians to prevent too much controversy by signing the de-
cree."'33 As with much of the privatization program since it began, the
program continues notwithstanding the objections of the hardliners.
The predictions of Anatoly Chubais that the program would outlast its
opposition have been realized.
Similar to the experience under the Joint Venture Decree, the
legal framework for privatization has generally evolved in directions
of greater openness for foreign capital. Given that the post-voucher
program is supposed to usher in the conclusion of privatization, it
would seem to be the place to offer the last significant concessions to
foreigners without the fear of jeopardizing privatization as a whole.
But has it all come too late? Have too many of the good Russian
enterprises already been privatized so that the new concessions to for-
eigners will make little practical difference? Isn't there a negative cor-
relation between the opportunities legally available to foreigners and
the availability of attractive privatizing enterprises?
The benefits to foreigners in the post-voucher privatization pro-
gram may be summarized as follows:
-Yeltsin mentions new tax breaks in the decree of July 22, 1994;
-the share benefits to worker collectives are less attractive than
in the voucher stage of privatization, meaning that workers will, pre-
sumably, buy fewer shares and leave more for foreign investors;1 4
-the absence of voucher auctions also means that fewer shares
will go into the population and more should be available for strategic
foreign investment;1
3 5
-expanded opportunities for land privatization will be attractive
to foreign investors;
36
-investment and commercial tenders remain options for
purchasing shares, but it is unclear whether private or negotiated deals
can now be contemplated. Section 2.6 of the post-voucher program
provides for "privatization without restrictions" and Section 3.4.2 on
investment tenders makes a typical reference to legislation to come,
President Enforces Goskomimushchestvo's Program, RussL,, PanSS Dit., avrailable in
LEXIS, World Library, SPD file.
133. Neela Banerjee, Yeltsin Signs Decree for Plan of Privatization, NVA.L ST. J., July
25, 1994, at A10; Leyla Boulton, Yeltsin Makes Concessions on Privatiskation, Fi'w. TIMES,
July 25, 1994, at 2.
134. Section 3.4.1 of the post-voucher program.
135. Id. sec. 3.4.
136. Id. art. 4.
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but Section 2.11 clearly states that no decision may contradict or ex-
pand on the methods of privatization already in place;
-foreign investors will find it very attractive that 51 percent of
privatization proceeds may remain in the privatized enterprise;
137
-more explicit language about post-privatization support has
been included;138 and
-the expansive powers of the GKI (exercised generally in a
manner favorable to foreign investors) have not been cut back in any
way.
Many of the changes in post-voucher privatization favor foreign
capital, and that was the principal rationale for opposition to the pro-
gram in the Duma. Yet the ambivalence toward foreign ownership of
former state property continues. Perhaps in part because of the pro-
foreign capital provisions in the 1994 program and in the post-voucher
program, foreign investment has recently been reported to be increas-
ing.139 Does this mean that resistance will increase to the point that
investments already in place will be threatened in some way? Or does
it mean that the role of foreign capital invested in privatized compa-
nies will now evolve into something less threatening, that is, only one
component of the large Russian economy?
VII. Conclusion
The foregoing comments demonstrate several points. First, priva-
tization in Russia has taken place in an extreme economic environ-
ment. The total dominance of the state over productive property,
pervasive central planning, the absence of any market sector, signifi-
cant corruption and capital flight, inflation and a valueless ruble all
worked against the gains that privatization could have achieved. The
normal goals of public sector reforms, such as maximization of reve-
nues from the sale of state assets, improved allocative and managerial
efficiency from true ownership, and attraction of foreign investment
could not be readily achieved under such conditions.
137. Id. art. 6 and app. 1.
138. Ii art. 5.
139. While total foreign capital invested in Russia in 1993 was reported to be around
$400 million, investment from abroad is now reported at about $500 million per month.
Foreign Investment Pours In, FIN. TiMFS, Sept. 9, 1994, at 2, and Warning on Russian Econ-
omy, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 1994, at A13. The article from the Wall Street Journal none-
theless declares premonitorily that "[floreign participation in Russia's economy has
become a sensitive political issue, with hard-liners frequently accusing the government of
selling out."
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The negative impact of economic conditions was worsened by the
strained political and legal situations. Factions disagreed fundamen-
tally over the course of reform, and consensus could be fashioned only
by executive action and only for short periods of time. Conflicting
and incomplete legislation, occasioned in part by the irreconcilable
struggle between Russia and the Soviet Union, but also by the per-
ceived need to draft virtually all of the legislation required by a mod-
em market economy overnight, compounded the problems, and
certainly made foreign investment even less of a prospect.
Finally, as though the economic, legal, and political problems
were not enough, the historical and cultural ambivalence over WVest-
ern influence no doubt filtered in at all levels of the process in subcon-
scious ways that will never be fully understood. 140 Western companies
encountered obstacles at almost every step of the process. Moreover,
by the time most of the obstacles to foreign participation in privatiza-
tion had been cleared away, the Russians were able to make very little
of real value available to be privatized. Substantial restrictions on for-
eign investment still exist in natural resources and former defense in-
dustries. Foreign banks have not been permitted to compete on a
level playing field either through buying shares in privatized Russian
banks or through investment in new entities.
This article began by noting two points: the endurance of the
privatization program and the extraordinarily low level of actual for-
eign investment. After more than half of a century of isolation from
foreign capital, laws permitting foreign investment have evolved in
generally favorable directions since 1987. Foreigners were supposed
to participate in privatization, but they have not. While the laws
evolved, many of the attitudes did not change. Westerners are still
viewed with a great deal of suspicion. That suspicion has tended now
towards overturning many of the fundamental economic policies of
the Yeltsin government. However, the major reform transforming the
structure of the economy through privatization, continues. It may be
140. Boris Fedorov has recently written "Up until now, little attention has been de-
voted to the role of foreign participation in the privatization process in Rusia. In fact,
Russian officials are often excessively cautious, if not outright hostile, towards foreign in-
vestment. This is evident for example in the restrictions on foreign investors, and the in-
cessant talk about the danger of foreigners buying everything too cheaply. This reluctance
existed long before the start of the current reforms and must be tackled as an unavoidable
reality." Boris G. Fedorov, Privatisation with Foreign Investment, in CAGING THE Eco-
NOMIC SYSMIrs IN RussiA 112 (Anders Aslund & Richard Layard eds., 1993).
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continuing largely because foreign investment has played a negligible
role in the process. 4'
Can Russia survive economically without foreign investment?
Most economists, Western and Russian, argue that only massive for-
eign investment can revitalize the economy. It seems likely, for the
reasons stated in this article, notwithstanding legal accommodations
and the rhetoric favoring inclusion of foreigners in privatization, that
significant foreign investment will have to await a later stage in the
transformation. "Privatization in one country" may be the political
price to be paid to achieve privatization at all.
141. A poll completed around the time of the December 1993 parliamentary elections
bears out the ambivalence traced in this article in the economic, legal and political con-
texts. The sample consisted of 34,000 Russians, 1,000 from each of the 32 regions and
Moscow and St. Petersburg. When asked whether the West has the goal of weakening
Russia with its economic advice, 28% were sure of it; 26% were not sure, but agreed that it
was probable; 17% said that it was probably not true; and only 11% said that the West was
not involved in such a nefarious plot. Out of the same group only 14% fully support for-
eign investment, while 60% think that it should be permitted only under strict government
control or that it is in fact harmful, "but sometimes useful." Yet, out of that same group,
42% think that privatization should continue at its current pace or be accelerated. Only
30% think that it should be either slowed or reversed. See Jerry Hough, Schlock Therapy:
The Russians Don't Want or Need Our Advice, WASH. PoST, Jan. 30, 1994, at C1. Again,
the likely explanation for this lack of consistency in thinking about reform is that foreign-
ers do not play a role in privatization.
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